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Abstract
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between economists focused on designing competi-
tive market mechanisms and engineers focused on the physical attributes and engineering
requirements they perceive as being needed for operating a reliable electric power system.
The paper starts by deriving the (second-best) optimal prices and investment program when
there are price-insensitive retail consumers, but when their load serving entities can choose
any level of rationing they prefer contingent on real time prices. It then examines the as-
sumptions required for a competitive wholesale and retail market to achieve this optimal
price and investment program. The paper examines the implications of relaxing several of
these assumptions. First, it analyzes the interrelationships between regulator-imposed price
caps and capacity obligations. It goes on to explore the implications of potential network col-
lapses, the concomitant need for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices
will provide incentives for investments consistent with these reserve requirements.
1 Introduction
Despite all of the talk about “deregulation” of the electricity sector, there continue to be a
large number of non-market mechanisms that have been imposed on the emerging competitive
wholesale and retail electricity markets. These mechanisms include wholesale market price caps
on energy supplies, generating capacity contracting obligations placed on electricity distribution
companies and other load serving entities (LSEs)1, and system operating reserve requirements.
In some cases the non-market mechanisms are argued to be justified by imperfections in
the retail or wholesale markets: in particular, problems caused by the inability of most retail
customers to see and react to real time prices with legacy meters, by non-price rationing of
demand, by wholesale market power problems and by imperfections in mechanisms adopted to
mitigate these market power problems.
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1Or in UK parlance “retail suppliers”.
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Other mechanisms and requirements have been justified by what are perceived to be special
physical characteristics of electricity and electric power networks which in turn lead to market
failures that are unique to electricity. These include the need to meet specific physical crite-
ria governing network frequency, voltage and stability that are thought to have public good
attributes, the rapid speed with which responses to unanticipated failures of generating and
transmission equipment must be accomplished to continue to meet these physical network re-
quirements and the possibility that market mechanisms cannot respond fast enough to achieve
the network’s physical operating parameters under all states of nature.
Much of the economic analysis of the behavior and performance of wholesale and retail
markets has either ignored these non-market mechanisms or failed to consider them in a com-
prehensive fashion. There continues to be a lack of adequate communication and understanding
between economists focused on the design and evaluation of alternative market mechanisms and
network engineers focused on the physical complexities of electric power networks and the con-
straints that these physical requirements may place on market mechanisms. The purpose of this
paper and of Joskow-Tirole (2005) is to start to bridge this gap.
The institutional environment in which our analysis proceeds has competing LSEs that
market electricity to residential, commercial and industrial (“retail”) consumers. Some retail
consumers served by competing LSEs see and can respond to real time wholesale energy prices,
while others are on traditional meters which record only their total consumption over some
period of time (for instance, a quarter), and therefore do not react to the real-time price.2 Retail
consumers may be subject to non-price rationing to balance supply and demand in real time. The
wholesale market is composed of generators who compete to sell power to LSEs. LSEs in turn
compete to resell this power to retail consumers using the transmission and distribution delivery
infrastructure. The prices for these delivery services are regulated and have been unbundled from
power supply services. In what follows we normalize the prices for delivery services to zero. The
wholesale market may be perfectly competitive or characterized by market power. Finally, there
is an independent system operator (ISO) which is responsible for operating the transmission
network in real time to support the wholesale and retail markets for power, including meeting
certain network reliability and wholesale market power mitigation criteria.
Section 2 first derives the optimal prices and investment program for an electric power system
when there is state contingent demand, at least some consumers do not react to real time prices,
2Retail consumers may also be on a real-time meter, and yet only partly responsive to the real-time price
due to transaction costs of adjusting consumption. As shown in Joskow-Tirole (2005), such consumers for the
purpose of positive and normative analyses, can be treated as reactive consumers as long as they rationally trade
off transaction costs and savings in their electricity bill. In particular, Proposition 1 still applies.
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but their LSE can choose any level of rationing it prefers contingent on real time prices. The
latter assumption is important. It implies that even if retail consumers do not have real time
meters and cannot see or react directly to the real time price, LSEs which do see real time prices
can enter into price-contingent priority rationing contracts (e.g. interruptible contracts) with
the retail consumers with whom they have power supply contracts (as in Chao-Wilson 1987). We
consider the effect of relaxing the assumption that individual retail consumers’ consumption can
be physically controlled by the system operator later in the paper and discuss the implications on
zonal rationing in the presence of retail competition in Proposition 3 below and in Joskow-Tirole
2005. In this model consumers are identical, possibly up to a proportionality factor, and therefore
all have the same load profile. While the latter significantly constrains the nature of consumer
heterogeneity considered, it is consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Borenstein-Holland,
2003).3 We then derive the competitive equilibrium under these assumptions when there are
competing LSEs that can offer two-part tariffs. This leads to a proposition that extends the
standard welfare theorem to price-insensitive consumers and rationing; this proposition serves
as an important benchmark for evaluating a number of non-market obligations and regulatory
mechanisms:
The second best optimum (given the presence of price-insensitive consumers) can be imple-
mented by an equilibrium with retail and generation (wholesale) competition provided that:
(a) The real time wholesale price accurately reflects the social opportunity cost of generation.
(b) Rationing, if any, is orderly, and makes efficient use of available generation.
(c) LSEs face the real time wholesale price for the aggregate consumption of the retail customers
for whom they are responsible.
(d) Consumers who can react fully to the real time price are not rationed. Furthermore, the
LSEs serving consumers who cannot fully react to the real time price can demand any level
of rationing they prefer contingent on the real-time price. That is, LSEs can enter into price
contingent rationing contracts with their retail customers (alternatively we will allow the system
operator to interrupt consumers to the best of their (ex ante) interests).
(e) Consumers have the same load profile4 (they are identical up to a scale factor).
The assumptions underlying this benchmark proposition are obviously very strong: (a) mar-
ket power on the one hand, and regulator-imposed price caps and other policy interventions on
the other hand create differences between the real time wholesale market price and the social
3Joskow-Tirole (2005) analyzes more complex characterizations of consumer heterogeneity in the presence of
retail competition.
4The phrase “load profile” here refers to the individual consumer’s level of demand in each hour of the year
relative to her peak hour demand.
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opportunity cost of generation; (b) network collapses, unlike say rolling blackouts, have sys-
temic consequences, in that some available generation cannot be used to satisfy load; (c) LSEs
do not face the real time price for their customers if these customers are load profiled;5 (d)
price-sensitive consumers may be rationed along with everyone else who is physically connected
to the same controllable distribution circuit; and, relatedly, LSEs generally cannot demand any
level of rationing they desire; (e) consumer heterogeneity is more complex than a scaling factor.
This paper examines the implications of relaxing assumptions (a) and (b), while Joskow-Tirole
(2005), that focuses on retail competition, investigates the failure of assumptions (c), (d), and
(e).
Section 3 studies the implications of distorted wholesale prices. It first considers the case
where there is a competitive supply of base load generation, market power in the supply of
investment in and production from peaking capacity that runs during peak demand periods,
and a price cap is applied that constrains the wholesale market price of energy to be lower than
the competitive price during peak periods. This creates a shortage of peaking capacity in the
long run. We show that placing generating capacity obligations on LSEs, combined with the
associated capacity prices paid to generators have the potential to restore investment incentives
by compensating generators ex ante for the shortfall in earnings that that they will incur due to
the price cap on energy produced from this capacity for the wholesale market. Indeed, with up
to two states of nature with market power, the Ramsey optimum can be achieved despite the
presence of market power through a combination of a price cap on energy and capacity obligations
and associated capacity prices provided that : (i) both peak and base load generating capacity are
eligible to meet LSE capacity obligations and receive the associated capacity price, and (ii) the
demand of all consumers, including price-sensitive consumers, counts for determining capacity
obligations and the capacity prices are reflected in the prices paid by all retail consumers. With
more than two states of nature with market power, a combination of spot wholesale market
price caps and capacity obligations will not achieve the Ramsey optimum. Thus, the regulator
faces a tradeoff between alleviating market power off-peak, if it is a problem, through a strict
price cap, and providing the proper investment incentives to meet peak demand efficiently, and
is further unable to provide price-sensitive consumers with the appropriate economic signals.
The intuition for this result is that when more than two prices are distorted by market power
the optimality of a competitive equilibrium cannot be restored with only two instruments – a
price cap on energy and a capacity price.
Section 4 derives the implications of network collapses and the concomitant need for net-
5By “load profiled” we mean that each consumer is billed based on the average load profile for a sample of
consumers with similar attributes whose consumption is metered on a real time basis.
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work support services that are typically provided by generating plants that the system operator
schedules as “operating reserves”. Network collapses differ from other forms of energy shortages
and rationing in a fundamental way. While scarcity makes available generation (extremely) valu-
able under orderly rationing, it makes it valueless when the network collapses.6 Hence, system
collapses, unlike, say, controlled rolling blackouts that shed load to match demand with avail-
able capacity, create a rationale for network support services with public goods characteristics.
We derive the optimal level for these network support services, and discuss the implementation
of the Ramsey allocation through a combination of operating reserve obligations and market
mechanisms.
2 A benchmark decentralization result with price-sensitive and
price-insensitive consumers
2.1 Model
There is a continuum of states of nature or periods i ∈ [0, 1]. The frequency of state i is denoted
fi (and so
R1
0
fidi = 1). Let E [·] denote the expectation operator with respect to the density
fi.7 We assume that the (unrationed) demand functions of price-insensitive and price-sensitive
consumers, Di and bDi, are increasing in i.8
Price-insensitive consumers are on traditional meters that record only their aggregate consump-
tion over all states of nature, and therefore they do not react to the real time price (RTP).9
Consumers are homogeneous, up to possibly a scaling factor, i.e., they have the same load pro-
file.10 Without loss of generality they are offered a two-part tariff, with a fixed fee A and a
marginal price p. Their demand function in the absence of rationing is denoted Di(p), with Di
increasing in i. We let αi · 1 denote the fraction of their demand satisfied in state i. As αi
decreases, the fraction of load interrupted (1− αi) increases. The alphas may be exogenous, as,
6An analogy may help in understanding the distinction between orderly rationing and a collapse: when a
mattress manufacturer fails, buyers of mattresses may experience delays; competitors however do not suffer and
may even gain from the failure. By contrast, a farmer whose cows have contracted mad cow disease may spoil
the entire market for beef.
6See Turvey and Anderson (1977, Chapter 14) for an analysis of peak period pricing and investment under
uncertainty when prices are fixed ex ante and all demand is subject to rationing with a constant cost of unserved
energy when demand exceeds available capacity.
7E [xi ] =
R1
0
xifidi.
8 In this paper, we do not allow intertemporal transfers in demand (demand in state i depends only on the price
faced by the consumer in state i). We could allow such transfers, at the cost of increased notational complexity.
9As in Joskow-Tirole (2005), we could also introduce consumers on real-time meters who do not monitor the
real-time price. This would not affect Proposition 1 below.
10Note that if consumers differ in the scale of their demand, this scale can be inferred from total consumption
and need not be known by the social planner or the LSEs.
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for example, when the system operator implements rolling blackouts. Alternatively, one could
envision situations in which the LSEs would affect the alphas either by demanding that their
consumers not be served as the wholesale price reaches a certain level, or conversely by bidding
for priority in situations of rationing;11 a case in point is that of consumers with interrruptible
contracts. We let Di (p,αi) denote their expected consumption in that state, and Si (p,αi) their
realized gross surplus, with
Di (p, 1) = Di(p) and Si (p, 1) = Si (Di(p)) ,
where Si is the standard gross surplus function (with S0i = p). We assume that Si is concave in
αi on [0, 1]: more severe rationing involves higher relative deadweight losses.
In the separable case, the demand Di takes the multiplicative form αiDi (p) and the surplus
takes the separable form Si (Di(p),αi).12 More generally however, the consumer may adjust her
demand to the prospect of being potentially rationed.13
We will also assume that lost opportunities to consume do not create value to the consumer.
Namely, the net surplus
Si (p,αi)− pDi (p,αi)
is maximized at αi = 1, that is, when it is equal to Si (Di(p))− pDi(p).
Let us now discuss specific cases to make this abstract formalism more concrete, and note
that the social cost of shortages depends on how fast demand and supply conditions change
relative to the reactivity of consumers.14
When the timing of the blackout is perfectly anticipated and blackouts are rolling across
geographical areas, then αi denotes the population percentage of geographical areas that are
not blacked out (and thus getting full surplus Si (Di (p))), and 1−αi the fraction of consumers
living in dark areas (and thus getting no surplus from electricity). With perfectly anticipated
blackouts, it makes sense to assume that
Si (p,αi) = αiSi (Di(p)) and Di (p,αi) = αiDi (p) .
11The latter of course assumes that the system operator can discriminate in its dispatch to LSEs in each state,
including in emergency situations that require the system operator to act quickly to avoid a cascading blackout.
12The surplus is linear in αi in the perfectly anticipated blackout case discussed immediately below. However,
more general expressions are feasible. For example, it is affine in αi in case (a) of the opportunity cost example
discussed subsequently.
13A case in point is voltage reduction. When the system operator reduces voltage by, say, 5%, lights become
dimmer, motors run at a slower pace, and so on. A prolonged voltage reduction, though, triggers a response:
consumers turn on more lights, motor speeds are adjusted. Another example of non-separability will be provided
below.
14This observation is made for example in Electricité de France (1994, 1995).
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An unexpected blackout may have worse consequences than a planned cessation of con-
sumption. For example, a consumer may prefer using the elevator to the stairs. If the outage
is foreseen, then the consumer takes the stairs (does not “consume” the elevator) and gets zero
surplus from the elevator. By contrast, the consumer obtains a negative surplus from the eleva-
tor if the outage is unforeseen and the consumer gets stuck in the elevator. Similarly, consumers
would have planned an activity requiring no use of electricity (going to the beach rather than
using the washing machine, drive their car or ride their bicycle rather than use the subway) if
they had anticipated the blackout; workers could have planned time off, etc. More generally,
with adequate warning consumers can take advance actions to adapt to the consequences of
an interruption in electricity supplies. This is one reason why distribution companies notify
consumers about planned outages required for maintenance of distribution equipment.
Opportunity cost example: Suppose that the consumer chooses between an electricity-consuming
activity (taking the elevator, using electricity to run a piece of equipment) and an electricity-free
approach (taking the stairs, using gas to run the equipment). The latter yields known surplus
S > 0. The surplus associated with the former depends not only on the marginal price p he faces
for electricity, but also on the probability 1 − αi of not being served. One can envision three
information structures: (a) The consumer knows whether he will be served (the elevator is always
deactivated through communication just before the outage); this is the foreseen rolling blackouts
case just described. (b) The consumer knows the state-contingent probability αi of being served,
but he faces uncertainty about whether the outage will actually occur (he knows that the period
is a peak one and he is more likely to get stuck in the elevator). (c) The consumer has no
information about the probability of outage and bases his decision on E [αi] (he just knows the
average occurrence of immobilizations in elevators). Letting Sni (p) ≡ max
D
{Si (D)− pD} denote
the net surplus in the absence of rationing; then
Si (p,αi)− pDi (p,αi) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αiSni (p) + (1− αi)S in case (a)
max
©
αiSni (p) , S
ª
in case (b)
αiSni (p) in case (c)
(provided that Sni (p) ≥ S and, in case (c), that E [αi] is high enough so that the consumer
chooses the electricity-intensive approach).
The value of lost load (VOLL) is equal to the marginal surplus associated with a unit increase
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in supply to these consumers, and is here given by
VOLLi =
∂Si
∂αi
∂Di
∂αi
,
since a unit increase in supply allows an increase in αi equal to 1/ [∂Di/∂αi]. When Di = αiDi,
then
VOLLi =
∂Si
∂αi
Di
.
So, with perfectly anticipated blackouts, which give consumers time to adapt their behavior in
anticipation of being curtailed, the value of lost load is equal to the average gross consumer
surplus. It is higher for unanticipated blackouts than for planned blackouts.
Price-sensitive consumers are modeled in exactly the same way and obey the exact same as-
sumptions as price-insensitive consumers. The only difference is that they face the real time
price and react to it. Let bpi denote the state-contingent price chosen by the social planner for
price-sensitive consumers; although we will later show that it is optimal to let price-sensitive con-
sumers face the RTP pi (so bpi = pi), we must at this stage allow the central planner to introduce
a wedge between the two prices. In state i their expected consumption is bDi (bpi, bαi) and their
gross surplus is bSi (bpi, bαi), where bαi is the rationing / interruptibility factor for price-sensitive
consumers.
The supply side is described as a continuum of investment opportunities indexed by the marginal
cost of production c. Let I(c) denote the investment cost of a plant producing one unit of
electricity at marginal cost c.15 There are constant returns to scale for each technology. We
denote by G(c) ≥ 0 the cumulative distribution function of plants.16 So, the total investment
cost is Z∞
0
I(c)dG(c).
The ex post cost of producing Qi isZ∞
0
cui(c)dG(c), where
Z∞
0
ui(c)dG(c) = Qi.
where the utilisation rate ui(c) belongs to [0, 1].
Remark : The uncertainty is here generated on the demand side. We could add an availability
factor λ (a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of plants is available, where λ is given by some cdf Hi (λ)) as in
Section 4 below. This would not alter the conclusions.
15For the undominated technologies, I(c) is decreasing in c.
16This distribution may not admit a continuous density. For example, only a discrete set of equipments may
be selected at the optimum.
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2.2 Optimum
A social planner chooses a marginal price p for price-insensitive consumers, and (for each state
i) marginal prices bpi for price-sensitive consumers, the extents of rationing αi and bαi, utilisation
rates ui(·) and the investment plan G(·) so as to solve:
max
¯
E[Si (p,αi) + bSi (bpi, bαi)− Z∞
0
cui(c)dG(c)]−
Z∞
0
I(c)dG(c)
°
s.t. Z∞
0
ui(c)dG(c) ≥ Di (p,αi) + bDi (bpi, bαi) for all i
Letting pifi denote the multiplier of the resource constraint in state i, the first-order conditions
yield:
a) Efficient dispatching:
ui(c) = 1 for c < pi and ui(c) = 0 for c > pi. (1)
b) Price-sensitive consumers:17
(i) bDi = bDi (pi)
(ii) bαi = 1. (2)
c) Price-insensitive consumers:
(i) E[
∂Si
∂p
− pi
∂Di
∂p
] = 0.
(ii) Either
∂Si
∂αi
∂Di
∂αi
= pi or αi ∈ {0, 1} . (3)
d) Investment :
Either I(c) = E [max {pi − c, 0}] or dG(c) = 0. (4)
These first-order conditions can be interpreted in the following way: condition (1) says
that only those plants whose marginal cost is smaller than the dual price pi are dispatched
in state i. Condition (2) implies that price-sensitive consumers are never rationed and that
17To prove condition (2), apply first the observation that by definition Di (pi , bαi ) is the net-surplus-maximizing
quantity for a consumer paying price pi for a given probability bαi of being served; and second our assumption
that lost opportunities don’t create value:bSi (bpi , bαi) − pi bDi (bpi , bαi) < bSi (pi , bαi ) − pi bDi (pi , bαi)
< bSi ³bDi (pi )´− pi bDi (pi) .
Hence, price sensitive consumers should not be rationed and should face price pi .
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their consumption decisions are guided by the state-contingent dual price. Condition (3) yields
the following formula for the price p = p∗ provided that price-insensitive consumers are never
rationed (αi ≡ 1):
E
£
(p∗ − pi)D
0
i (p
∗)
¤
= 0. (5)
In case of rationing (αi < 1 for some i), its implications depend on the efficiency of rationing;
condition (3) in the separable case and for an interior solution yields the following formula:
E[[
∂Si
∂Di
− αipi]D0i(p)] = 0.
For example, for perfectly foreseen outages, using the consumer’s first-order condition for the
choice of Di(p), ∂Si/∂Di = αip, condition (3) boils down to:
E
£
(p− pi)
£
αiD0i (p)
¤¤
= 0. (6)
Condition (3ii) implies that in all cases of rationing
VOLLi = pi.
That is, generators and LSEs should all face the value of lost load.
Finally, condition (4) is the standard free-entry condition for investment in generation.
2.3 Competitive equilibrium
Let us now assume that price-sensitive and price-insensitive consumers are served by competitive
LSEs, that LSEs face the real time wholesale price for the aggregate consumption of the retail
customers for whom they are responsible, and that they can demand any level of state-contingent
rationing αi (pi) for their consumers. This latter assumption implies that LSEs can enter into
priority rationing contracts with their consumers (as in Chao-Wilson 1987).
The following proposition shows that, despite price-insensitive consumptions, retail compe-
tition is consistent with Ramsey optimality provided that five assumptions are satisfied:
Proposition 1 The second-best optimum (that is, the socially optimal allocation given the ex-
istence of price-insensitive retail consumers) can be implemented by an equilibrium with retail
and generation competition provided that:
(a) the RTP reflects the social opportunity cost of generation,
(b) available generation is made use of during rationing periods,
(c) load-serving entities face the RTP,
(d) price-sensitive consumers are not rationed; furthermore, while price-insensitive consumers
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may be rationed, their load-serving entity can demand any level of state-contingent rationing
αi,18 by, for example, auctioning price-contingent interruptible contracts to retail consumers.
(e) consumers have homogeneous demand and surplus functions (possibly up to a scaling factor).
Proof : Suppose that competing retailers (LSEs) can offer to price-insensitive contracts {A,p,α·},
that is two-part tariffs with fixed fee A and marginal price p cum a state-contingent extent of
rationing αi. Retail competition induces the maximization of the joint surplus of the retailer
and the consumer:
max
{p,α·}
E [Si (p,αi)− piDi (p,αi)] .
The first-order conditions for this program are nothing but conditions (3) above. The rest of
the economy is standard, and so the fundamental theorem of welfare economics applies. Q.E.D.
Remark : Chao-Wilson (1987) also emphasize the use of bids for priority servicing. Chao and
Wilson show that when consumers are heterogeneous and have unit and state-independent de-
mands, the first-best (hence rationing free) allocation can be implemented equivalently through
a spot market or an ex ante priority servicing auction. Proposition 1 by contrast considers ho-
mogeneous consumers and introduces price-insensitive consumers; accordingly, markets are here
only second-best optimal and the second-best optimal allocation may involve actual rationing.
2.4 Two-state example
There are two states: off-peak (i = 1) and peak (i = 2), with frequencies f1 and f2 (f1+ f2 = 1);
price-insensitive retail customers have demandsD1(p) and D2(p) with associated gross surpluses
(in the absence of rationing) S1 (D1(p)) and S2 (D2(p)). Price-sensitive customers (who react
to real-time pricing) have demands bD1(p) and bD2(p), with associated gross surpluses (in the
absence of rationing) bS1(bD1(p)) and bS2(bD2(p)). We assume that rationing may occur only
at peak (α1 = 1 , α2 · 1). In this two-state example p∗ denotes the optimal non-contingent
(constant) marginal price faced by price-insensitive retail consumers and p∗1 and p
∗
2 denote the
optimal off-peak and peak (contintent) marginal prices, respectively.
A unit of baseload capacity costs I1 and allows production at marginal cost c1. Let K1 denote
the baseload capacity. The unit cost of installing peaking capacity is I2 < I1. The marginal
operating cost of the peakers is c2 > c1.
Social optimum: Letting p∗ denote the (constant) price faced by price-insensitive consumers,
18Here the state and the price are mapped one-to-one. More generally, they may not be (the state of nature
involves unavailability of plants, say). The proposition still holds as long as LSEs can select a state-contingent
αi .
11
the (second-best) social optimal solves over
­
p∗,α2 , bD1, bD2®
maxW = max
­
f1[S1 (D1 (p
∗)) + bS1(bD1)− c1K1]− I1K1
+f2[S2 (p∗,α2) + bS2(bD2)− c1K1 − c2K2]− I2K2®
where
K1 ≡ D1 (p∗) + bD1 (7)
K2 ≡ [D2 (p∗,α2) + bD2]− [D1 (p∗) + bD1] (8)
Applying the general analysis yields (provided that the peakers’ marginal cost c2 weakly
exceeds the off-peak price p1):
Either bS0i = pi or bDi = 0, (2’i)
f1 (p
∗ − p1)D01 + f2(
∂S2
∂p − p2
∂D2
∂p ) = 0 (3’i)
and
f1 (p1 − c1) + f2 (p2 − c1) = I1 ⇐⇒ f1p1 + f2p2 = I1 + c1
f2 (p2 − c2) = I2 ⇐⇒ p2 = c2 + (I2/f2) (as long as K2 > 0 ).
Let p∗1 < p
∗ < p∗2 be defined by:
p∗2 ≡ c2 + (I2/f2)
and
p∗ ≡ f1p∗1 + f2p∗2 ≡ I1 + c1.
Note that the free entry investment conditions imply that the peak price exceeds the marginal
operating cost of peaking capacity in equilibrium.
To illustrate these conditions, let us focus on the case of:
Perfectly foreseen rolling blackouts: S2 (p,α2) = α2S2 (D2(p)).
In this case, for an available peak capacity K1 + K2 and a pre-set retail price p charged to
price-insensitive consumers, the optimal allocation of capacity among the price-sensitive and
-insensitive consumers is given by:
max
{p2 , α2 }
­bS2 ³bD2 (p2)´+ α2S2 (D2(p))®
s.t.bD2 (p2) + α2D2(p) · K1 + K2.
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Let p2(p) denote the solution to:
S2 (D2(p)) = p2D2(p).
Then:
α2 = 0 if p2 > p2(p)
= 1 if p2 < p2(p)
∈ [0, 1] if p2 = p2(p).
The maximum spot price at which price-insensitive consumers ought to be served, p2(p), is
an increasing fucntion of p: A higher retail price reduces demand and thereby makes average
consumption more desirable.
We can now endogenize the retail price:
(a) Interruptability regime (α2 = 0) :
In this regime the price charged to price-insensitive consumers is equal to the off-peak price
(p = p∗1) and the retail consumers’ surplus is f1 [S1 (D1(p
∗
1))− p
∗
1D1(p
∗
1)]. This requires that:
p∗2 > p2(p
∗
1).
(b) No-interruptability regime (α2 = 1):
The optimal price charged to price-insensitive consumers maximizes expected surplus:
max
{p}
{f1 [S1 (D1(p))− p∗1D1(p)] + f2 [S2 (D2(p))− p
∗
2D2(p)]}
yielding:
E
£
(p− p∗i )D
0
i (p)
¤
= 0. (6’)
This expression takes a particularly simple form for linear demands:
Di(p) = ai − bp.
Then
p = E (p∗i ) = p
∗.
This regime requires that:
p∗2 < p2 (p
∗) .
Let us for example vary the peak cost parameters c2 or I2, and thereby vary p∗2 below p2 (p
∗)
(the latter being exogenously given by p∗ = I1 + c1). As p∗2 decreases, p
∗
1 increases. And so
there is indeed a level at which p∗2 = p2 (p
∗
1). It is easy to show that there exists bp2 such that:
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• for p∗2 < bp2 , non-interruptability is optimal,
• for p∗2 > bp2 , interruptability is optimal.
Furthermore
p2
µ
I1 + c1 − f2p∗2
f1
¶
< bp2 < p2 (p∗) .19
We can therefore state:
Proposition 2 Rationing (α2 < 1) of price-insensitive consumers may be optimal.
The same analysis offers some insight as to the impact of retail competition when there is
only zonal rationing. Let us assume that LSEs are charged for the real-time consumption of their
customers, but that consumers cannot be interrupted individually (so the fourth assumption in
Proposition 1 is violated). That is, the physical topology of the distribution network only
allows the system operator physically to ration groups of consumers connected to the same
distribution feeder – what we refer to in Joskow-Tirole 2005 as "zonal rationing." Instead, the
system operator optimizes over the interruptability decision α2 in a given geographical zone as
a reaction to the "average retail contract" offered by the LSEs. Whenever
p2 (p
∗
1) < p
∗
2 < p2 (p
∗) ,
there are two equilibria in retail competition: If all LSEs offer marginal price p∗1, then the
system operator will interrupt price-insensitive retail customers, whose consumption is expensive
and not that valuable in per unit terms. Anticipating interruptability, LSEs offer p = p∗1.
Similarly, p = p∗ is also an equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria, together with the earlier
characterization of the optimal regime, shows that the marginal price may be too low or too
high under retail competition.20
Proposition 3 Suppose that consumers can be curtailed only at the zonal, rather than individual,
level and that the system operator’s curtailement decisions maximize consumer welfare. Then
LSE competition results in two equilibria, one at price p∗1 and the other at price p
∗, provided
that
p2 (p
∗
1) < p
∗
2 < p2 (p
∗) .
19To see this, note that the maximand in the non-interruptability regime decreases with p∗2 . At p
∗
2 = p2 (p
∗),
the maximand is equal to f1 [S1 (D1 (p∗)) − p∗1D1 (p
∗)] < f1 [S1 (D1 (p
∗
1 )) − p
∗
1D1 (p
∗
1 )]. And conversely for the
interruptability regime.
20This multiple equilibrium problem would not emerge if the system operator committed to a rationing policy
ex ante (when retail contracts are designed). Joskow-Tirole 2005 examine various aspects of zonaI rationing in
this context.
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3 Price caps on energy, capacity obligations, and capacity prices
As discussed in the introduction, the assumptions underlying Proposition 1 are very strong. We
now proceed to examine the consequences of three attributes of electricity markets in practice:
(a) market power on the one hand, and price caps and other policy interventions on the other
hand that create departures of real time prices from the social opportunity cost of generation;
(b) available generation does not supply load or receive payments during blackouts associated
with a network collapse; (c) technological constraints in the distribution network imply that
consumers who are sensitive to real time prices may be blacked out along with everyone else
and, relatedly, LSEs cannot generally demand any level of rationing they desire.
3.1 Capacity obligations and capacity prices
The attributes of an electric power system’s power supplies are often characterized by two pri-
mary variables. The first is the installed generating capacity on the system. Generating capacity
measures the instantaneous physical capability of generating facilities to produce electrical en-
ergy. The quantity of generating capacity can be increased with additional investment and
declines when generating plants are retired.21 The second variable is the quantity of electrical
energy supplied at each point in time by this generating capacity. It is electrical energy that
is of value to consumers. Since electricity cannot be stored the quantity of generating capacity
must be at least as large as peak demand to avoid blackouts. And since demand varies widely
from hour to hour during the year, the quantity of electricity produced relative to the stock of
generating capacity on the system varies widely over the hours of the year as well.
Spot wholesale electricity markets are typically organized around the supply and demand
for electrical energy and these markets yield time-varying spot prices for electrical energy. In
the U.S., most of the organized spot wholesale markets for electrical energy place a cap on
the price at which electrical energy can be sold. To the extent that these prices are binding,
they are reflected as well in forward prices for energy in over-the-counter markets and bilateral
transactions. These price caps have been put in place to mitigate market power in spot wholesale
markets.
The organized wholesale markets in the Northeastern U.S. have also introduced “capacity
21Generating capacity may not always be available to supply energy due to planned maintenance and unplanned
breakdowns or outages. Accordingly, the expected generating capacity available to supply electrical energy at a
point in time is less then the nominal capacity. We ignore availability considerations in this section. Generating
plants may also produce other products such as reactive power and frequency regulation which we also ignore
here.
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obligations” that are imposed on all LSEs. In these markets, LSEs not only have a financial
obligation to purchase (or supply internally) all of the electrical energy consumed by their
retail customers in real time, but also have an obligation to contract for sufficient generating
capacity ex ante to meet their peak demand plus an administratively determined reserve margin
reflecting uncertainties about future demand and generating capacity availability. Capacity
obligations may take at least two forms. One requires LSEs to forward contract with generators
to make their capacity available to the spot wholesale market operated by the system operator
during peak demand periods, leaving the price for any energy supplied by this capacity to be
determined ex post in the spot market. Alternatively, the capacity obligations could require
forward contracting for both the price of capacity and the price of energy (or operating reserves)
that this capacity supplies to the spot market during peak hours.22
For example, an LSE in the wholesale markets operated by the PJM Regional Transmission
Organization covering states in the Mid-Atlantic and Mid-Western regions of the U.S. has an
obligation to contract forward for generating capacity (but not the actual energy it may produce
in real time) equal to its annual peak demand plus an administratively determined reserve
margin. If it fails to have such contracts in place it is assessed a deficiency penalty. There is
a market for capacity to meet LSE capacity obligations which yields a capacity price which we
denote below as pK and which we assume is less than the deficiency charge so the deficiency
charge does not serve as a binding price cap on capacity prices.23 We assume as well that
the level of the capacity obligation selected by the regulator is optimal, reflecting consumer
valuations for energy and the cost of blackouts. In what follows, we refer interchangeably to
capacity obligations and the associated capacity prices pK determined in the market for capacity.
When the capacity obligations are placed on all LSEs (and thus on the peak demand placed on
the system by all retail customers) it has the effect of requiring all demand to pay the capacity
price and allows all qualifying generating capacity to receive the capacity price.
Proposition 1 shows that price-insensitive customers alone do not create a rationale for
capacity obligations. Rather, there must be some reason why the spot price for energy does not
22Another approach is for the system operator to purchase reliability contracts from generators on behalf of
the load. Vazquez et al (2001) have designed a more sophisticated capacity obligations scheme, in which the
system operator purchases reliability contracts that are a combination of a financial call option with a high
predetermined strike price and an explicit penalty for non-delivery. Such capacity obligations are bundled with a
hedging instrument, as the consumer purchasing such a call option receives the difference between the spot price
and the strike price whenever the former exceeds the latter.
23The capacity markets in the Northeast are being reformed in ways that yield an administratively determined
price for capacity that varies with the system’s actual reserve margin as measured by the ratio of generating
capacity to peak demand. The formulas used to determine these prices are similar to those used between 1990
and 2001 in the old UK electricity pool to determine capacity prices. These formulas effectively serve as price
caps on capacity prices as well. See Cramton and Stoft (2005).
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fully adjust to reflect supply and demand conditions and differs from the correct economic signal.
This section argues that capacity obligations and associated capacity prices have the potential to
restore (partially or fully) investment incentives in a market in which generator market power or
sheer regulatory opportunism induce regulators to keep spot prices low. It also briefly discusses
other reasons why spot prices for energy may not provide the proper investment signals. Like
in section 2.4, we specialize the model in most of this section to two states of nature.
The regulator may impose a price cap (p2 · pmax) on wholesale energy prices, which in
turn are reflected directly in retail prices given perfect competition among retailers, in order to
prevent generators from exercising market power in the wholesale market during peak demand
periods. Suppose that:
• baseload investment in generating capacity and production of energy is competitive (as
earlier),
• peakload investment in generating capacity and production of energy are supplied by an
n-firm Cournot oligopoly.
We have in mind a relatively short horizon (certainly below 3 years), so that new peaking
investment cannot be built in response to strategic withholding (in this interpretation, I2 is
probably best viewed as the cost of maintaining existing peakers). The timing has two stages:
First, firms choose the capacity that they will make available to the market. Second, they supply
this capacity in the market for energy. In a first step, we leave aside rationing; we later look at
the two-way interaction between interruptability and the exercise of market power.
3.2 No rationing
In the absence of a price cap, an oligopolist in the peaking capacity market chooses the amount
of capacity to make available to the market Ki2 so as to solve:
max
p2
⎧
⎨
⎩[f2 (p2 − c2)− I2] [D2 (p) +
bD2 (p2)− K1 −X
j 6=i
K
j
2]
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
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where p is, as earlier, the state-independent retail price. Letting bη2 ≡ −∂ bD2∂p2 / bD2p2 denote the
elasticity of demand of the price-sensitive customers, one obtains the following Lerner formula:24
p2 − [c2 +
I2
f2
]
p2
=
1
nbη2 [ [bD2 (p2)− bD1 (p1)] + [D2(p)−D1(p)]bD2 (p2) ] > 0, (9)
or,
p2 = p
C
2 , where p
C
2 is the Cournot price.
As expected, the oligopolistic relative markup decreases with the number of firms and with
the elasticity of demand of price-sensitive consumers, and decreases when price-insensitive con-
sumers become price-sensitive.25
Condition (9), together with the market clearing equations (K1 = D1(p) + bD1 (p1) and
K1 + K2 = D2(p) + bD2 (p2)) as well as the competitive retail price condition given an expected
price p2 at peak (as studied in section 2.4; for example, with linear demands, p = f1p1 + f2p2 =
p∗), determines the equilibrium capacities, K1 and K2, and prices, p1, p2, p.
A price cap on energy production pmax = p∗2 = c2 + (I2/f2) restores the Ramsey optimum.
By contrast, a price cap creates a shortage of peakers whenever pmax < p∗2.
26
Let us now show that (i) with two states of nature, the Ramsey optimum can nevertheless
be attained through capacity obligations and the associated capacity prices even if the price cap
on spot energy production is set too low, and (ii) with three states of nature, the combination
of a price cap on energy production and capacity obligations and associated capacity prices
restores the Ramsey optimum provided that the price cap is set at the competitive level in the
lowest-demand state in which there is market power.
With two states of nature and a price cap that is set too low, to get the same level of
investment and production in the second best as in the competitive equilibrium, the oligopolists
must receive a capacity price pK satisfying
I2 − pK = f2 (p
max − c2) .
24The other equilibrium conditions are:
K1 = D1 (p) + bD1 (p1 ),
f1p1 + f2p2 = c1 + I1 ,
and
E [(p − pi)D0i(p)] = 0.
25Through the installation of a communication system, say. Because price-sensitivity reduces the consumption
differential between peak and off peak, the numerator on the right-hand side of (9) decreases (and bD2 increases)
as some more consumers become price-sensitive.
26The simple two-state example analyzed here assumes that during peak periods the price cap has been set
below p∗2 to characterize the more general case in which the price cap is, on average, lower than the competitive
market price. If the price cap were set high enough to ensure that pmax = p∗2 it would not lead to shortages of
peaking capacity. However, the $1000/MWh (or lower) price caps that are now used in the U.S. appear to us to
be significantly lower than the VOLL in some high demand states.
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[We assume that, as in PJM, the firm must supply K2 ex post if requested to do so, and so ex
post withholding of supplies is not an issue.]
Note that
pK + f2p
max = f2p
∗
2 ⇐⇒ pK = f2 (p∗2 − pmax)
and so
I1 − pK = f2 (p
max − c1) + f1 (p1 − c1) ,
so incentives for baseload production are unchanged, provided that baseload plants are made
eligible for capacity payments.27
Another important point is that price-sensitive consumers consume too much (they consumebD2 (pmax) at peak) unless capacity obligations are imposed on LSEs in a way that reflects
the peak demand of all of the retail consumers that they serve. The price paid by all retail
consumers must also include the price of capacity pK in order to restore proper incentives on
the demand side. We thus conclude that price-sensitive consumers should be subject to capacity
obligations.28
Proposition 4 Capacity obligations and the associated capacity prices have the potential to re-
store investment incentives by compensating generators ex ante for the shortfall in earnings that
they will incur due to the price cap. Suppose that baseload generation is competitive and that
there are at most three states of nature (and hence at most two states of nature with market
power),
• The Ramsey optimum can be achieved despite the presence of market power in the ex post
energy market through a combination of price cap on energy production and regulated capacity
obligations and associated capacity prices, provided that
• off-peak plants are eligible to satisfy LSE capacity obligations and to receive capacity pay-
ments,
• all consumers (including price-sensitive ones) are subject to the capacity obligations, and they
pay the applicable capacity prices.
Remark : Regulators sometimes introduce price caps for reasons other than a desire to mitigate
market power in the energy market. The following two examples discuss two of the primary
27Note that in New England, New York and PJM, all generating capacity meeting certain reliability criteria
counts as ICAP capacity and can receive ICAP payments.
28Similarly, the signal for penalizing a failure to deliver is lost: pmax is an underestimate of the social cost
associated with a supplier’s failure to deliver. The proper measure of the cost of default is therefore pmax + pK .
The capacity obligation price pK can also be used as the basis for computing the penalty for those LSEs that
underpredict their peak demand and are short of capacity obligations.
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additional rationales for imposing administrative price caps. Suppose that there is perfect com-
petition and two states of nature but the regulator imposes an unannounced price cap, pmax < p∗2,
once K2 has been sunk. A regulatory rule that sets a price cap equal to the marginal operating
cost of the peaking unit with the highest marginal operating cost is an example. Such a rule
precludes recovery of the scarcity rents needed to provide appropriate incentives for investment
in peaking capacity. Then one would want a capacity payment to offset insufficient incentives:
pK = f2 (p
∗ − pmax) .
The second best is then restored (subject to the caveats enunciated in the next subsection,
except for the one on ex ante monopoly behavior, which is not relevant here).
The imposition of a price cap in this case is of course a hold-up on peak-load investments
(peakers).29 In practice, what potential investors in peaking capacity want is effectively a forward
contract that commits to capacity payments to cover their investment costs to ensure that they
are not held up ex post. They are comfortable that they have a good legal case that they can’t
be forced to produce if the price does not at least cover their variable production costs. It is
the “scarcity rents” that they are concerned will be extracted by regulators or the ISO’s market
monitors.
Another rationale for a capacity obligation arises in the presence of a choke price: bD2 (p∗2) =
0 (the peak price goes up so much that no consumer under RTP ever wants to consume).
Alternatively, one could consider the very, very short run, for which basically no-one can react
(even the bD consumers). Either way, the supply and demand curves are both vertical and the
price is infinite (given D2 (p∗) > K2 under the first hypothesis).
One can set p2 =VOLL in order to provide generators with the right incentives in the
absence of capacity payment. As Stoft (2002) argues, VOLL pricing augments market power.
But again, it is unclear whether market power is best addressed through price caps or through
a requirement that LSEs enter into forward contracts for a large fraction of their peak demand
or through some other mechanism. Another potential issue is that the regulatory commitment
to VOLL pricing (that may reach 500 times the average energy price) may be weak. A third
potential issue is that the VOLL is very hard to compute: As we discussed above, the outage
cost for the consumer varies substantially with the degree of anticipation of the outage and its
length.30
29Regulatory hold-ups may occur through other channels than price caps. For example, the ISO may purchase
excessive peaking capacity and dispatch it at marginal operating cost during peak.
30Electricité de France (1994, 1995).
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Whatever the reason, regulatory authorities most often set a price cap that lies way below
(any reasonable measure of) the VOLL. As is well-known and was discussed earlier, the price
cap depresses incentives for investment in peakers. Consumers and LSEs individually have no
incentive to compensate for the peakers’ shortfall in earnings to the extent that benefits from
capacity investment are reaped by all (a free rider problem).
Thus, the analysis is qualitatively the same as previously; quantitatively, though, the effects
are even more dramatic due to the very large wedge between the price cap and the socially
optimal price during outages.
3.3 Some limitations of capacity obligations
There are at least two potential problems that may result from a policy of applying binding
price caps to the price of energy sold in the wholesale spot market that cannot be remedied with
capacity obligations and associated capacity prices.
• Ex ante monopoly behavior : If one just lets the oligopolists choose the number of capacity
contracts qi2, then the oligopolists are likely to restrict the number of these contracts. Actually,
in the absence of price-insensitive consumers and assuming that the number of generators is the
same (n) in the capacity and wholesale spot markets, one can show a neutrality result : The
outcome with ex post price cap and ex ante capacity obligation is the same as that with no price
cap and no capacity obligation. The oligopolists just exploit their monopoly power ex ante.31
To see this, note that consumers must pay pK
f2
+ pmax per unit of peak consumption.
Oligopolist i therefore chooses to offer an amount qi2 of capacity contracts solving
max
pK
{[f2 (p
max − c2) + pK − I2] [bD2(pK
f2
+ pmax)− K1 −
X
j 6=i
q
j
2]}.
The first-order condition is the same as (9), with
pK
f2
+ pmax = pC2 .
Proposition 5 With price-sensitive consumers, the combination of a price cap and capacity oblig-
ations has no impact on market power and the final allocation when generators rather than the
regulator select the number of capacity obligations they supply.
31The ex ante market might be more competitive than the ex post market, in which capacity constraints are
binding (this is the view taken for example in Chao-Wilson 2003). If so, how much more competitive depends on
the horizon. Competition in peaking generation may be more intense 3 years ahead than 6 months ahead, and a
fortiori a day ahead.
Note that we have not considered ex ante "bypass investments" by the consumers; anticipating high peak prices
in the absence of price cap, consumers would overinvest in inefficient self-provision of peakers, putting downward
pressure on the peak price until the spot price and the bypass cost are equalized. The study of bypass with or
without price caps and with or without capacity obligations lies outside the scope of this paper.
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Proposition 5 implies that the price or the quantity of capacity obligations must be regulated
in order for the ex post price cap on energy production to alleviate market power.
The analysis with price-insensitive consumers is more complex, because the oligopolists can
through the capacity market affect the price p offered by LSEs to price-insensitive consumers
and thereby the latter’s peak consumption, while they took D2(p) as given in our earlier analysis
of spot markets.
An issue involving the nature of the contract supporting the capacity obligation has become
somewhat confused in the policy discussions about capacity obligations. If the contract estab-
lishes an ex ante price for the right to call on a specified quantity of generating capacity in
the future but the price for the energy to be supplied ex post is not specified in the forward
contract, then, as shown above, the contracts supporting the capacity obligation are unlikely
to be effective in mitigating market power unless the market for such contracts is more com-
petitive than the spot market. If the capacity obligation is met with a contract that specifies
both the capacity price and the energy supply price ex ante then such forward contracts can
mitigate market power even if the forward market is no more competitive than the spot market
(Allaz-Vila 1993).
• A capacity payment is an insufficient instrument with more than two states of nature with
market power. The capacity payment pK should compensate for the revenue shortfall (relative
to the socially optimal price) created by the price cap at peak. With many states of nature and
many means of production (as in section 2.2), the capacity payment can still compensate for
the expected revenue shortfall for peakers and therefore for non-peakers as well if the price cap
corrects for market power at peak. However, the price cap then fails to properly correct for any
market power just below peak. Conversely, a price cap can correct for an arbitrary number of
periods/ state of nature in which there is market power, provided that the plants be dispatchable
in order to qualify for capacity obligations;32 but, it then fails to ensure cost recovery for the
peakers. To see this, suppose that i ∈ [0, 1] as earlier, and that there is market power for i ≥ i0.
The price cap must be set so that:
pmax = p∗i
0
.
Cost recovery for plants that in the Ramsey optimum operate if and only if i ≥ i0 requires that:
pK = E[(p
∗
i − p
max) 1Ii≥i
0
]
32The dispatching requirement comes from the fact that (with more than three states) the price cap may need
to be lower than the marginal cost of some units that are dispatched in the Ramsey optimum. Also, note that
the ISO must be able to rank-order plants by marginal cost in order to avoid inefficient dispatching.
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(where 1Ii≥i
0
= 1 if i ≥ i
0
and 0 otherwise). But then a higher marginal cost plant, that should
operate when i ≥ k > i
0
over -recoups its investment as:
pK > E[(p
∗
i − p
max) 1Ii≥k].
Similarly, the combination of a price cap and a capacity payment cannot provide the proper
signals in all states of nature to price-sensitive consumers if there are more than three states.
With three states (i = 1, 2, 3), though, the price cap can be set at p∗2. Then f3 (p
∗
3 − p
max) = pK
implies that f2 (p∗2 − p
max) + f3 (p
∗
3 − p
max) = pK.
This reasoning has a standard “instruments vs targets” flavor. When more than two prices
are distorted by market power (which, incidentally, also would have been the case with three
states of nature, had we assumed that none of the markets was competitive), two instruments,
namely a price cap and a capacity price, cannot restore optimality of the competitive equilibrium.
Optimality can be achieved through an array of (state-contingent) capacity obligation markets,
although one may worry about transaction costs and market power when markets multiply.
Remark : We have considered only aggregate uncertainty. However, a price-sensitive industrial
consumer (or an undiversified LSE) further faces idiosyncratic uncertainty. A potential issue
then is that while the capacity payment can supply the consumer with a proper average incen-
tive to consume during peak (say, when there are two aggregate states), it implies that, when
unable to trade capacity obligations ex post, the consumer will overconsume for low idiosyncratic
demand and underconsume in high states of idiosyncratic demand (provided that penalties for
exceeding the capacity obligation are stiff). This problem can however be avoided, provided that
consumers regroup to iron out idiosyncratic shocks (in a mechanism similar to that of “bubbles”
in emission trading programs, or to the reserve sharing arrangements that existed prior to the
restructuring of electricity systems).33
Proposition 6 With more than two states of nature with market power, a combination of a
price cap and capacity obligations and associated capacity prices is in general inconsistent with
Ramsey optimality. The regulator faces a trade-off between alleviating market power off peak
through a strict price cap and not overincentivizing peakers; and is further unable to provide
price-sensitive consumers with proper economic signals in all states of nature.
33The consumers that regroup within a bubble must then design an internal market (with price p∗2 ) in order
to induce an internally efficient use of their global capacity obligations.
23
3.4 Rationing
As section 2.4 showed, price-insensitive retail consumers are not rationed as long as the peak price
is sufficiently low, i.e., if the cost of peakers is not too large and if there is enough competition
among peakers to keep p2 close to the long-term marginal cost of peakers.
It is worth considering the opposite case, in which the system operator or the LSEs would
like the price-insensitive retail consumers to be interrupted during peak. Consider the case of a
monopoly provider of peak generation (it is straightforward to extend the analysis to Cournot
competition, as earlier). Fixing the retail price p and the off-peak capacity K1 for the moment,
consider the monopolist’s choice of peak price p2. It solves:
max { max
{p2 · p2(p)}
­
(p2 − p∗2)
hbD2 (p2) +D2(p)− K1i® ,
max
{p2 > p2(p)}
­
(p2 − p∗2)
hbD2 (p2)− K1i® .}
That is, the monopolist can either charge a "low" price and keep the price-insensitive retail
consumers on board, or charge a very high price and focus on the price-sensitive consumers.34
The demand curve facing the monopolist is illustrated in figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
For expositional simplicity, let us assume that price-insensitive consumers’ demand is linear
(Di(p) = ai − bp) and so, in the absence of rationing,
p = p∗ = E(pi) = c1 + I1
(the analysis extends straightforwardly to non-linear demands). In all equilibria:
K1 = bD1(p1) +D1(p)
and
f1p1 + f2p2 = c1 + I1.
There are three possible regimes (see figure 1):
• Unconstrained, no-rationing equilibrium: This is the regime studied in section 3.2 and depicted
by point A in figure 1. The monopoly price, pm2 , maximizes:
(p2 − p
∗
2)
hbD2(p2) +D2(p∗)− K1i
34Note that we assume that the system operator has no commitment power and therefore optimizes over the
interruptability decision ex post (and so rations retail consumers whenever p2 > p2 (p)). Otherwise, it could
threaten to ration at a low peak price, so as to alleviate market power.
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and satisfies:
pm2 · p2(p
∗).
Thus price-insensitive consumers are never rationed and are charged p∗.
• Unconstrained, rationing equilibrium: In this regime (depicted by point B in figure 1), the
peaking monopolist charges bpm2 , which maximizes:
(p2 − p
∗
2)
hbD2(p2)− K1i .
Furthermore: bpm2 > p2(p1)
where p1, the off-peak price (which is also the retail price), is given by the baseload units’ free
entry condition:
f1p1 + f2bpm2 = c1 + I1 = p∗.
Because bpm2 > p2(p1) > p1, necessarily p1 < p∗; hence p2(p∗) < p2(p1). As in the analysis of
LSE competition and zonal rationing, the expectation that the consumer will be curtailed lowers
the retail price, which makes the occurrence of rationing more likely.
• Kinked, no-rationing equilibrium: In this regime (depicted by point C in figure 1), the
monopolist charges the highest price that is consistent with the price-insensitive consumers not
being interrupted:
p2 = p2 (p
∗) .
This regime requires that pm2 > p2(p
∗) and that the monopolist prefers to keep all consumers
on board:
max
­
(p2 − p
∗
2)
hbD2(p2)− K1i® · [p2(p∗)− p∗2] hbD2 (p2(p∗)) +D2(p∗)− K1i .
It can be shown that rationing and non-rationing equilibria may coexist. Intuitively, the
absence of rationing leads to a high retail price, which, because p2(·) is increasing, allows
the monopolist to demand a high peak price without triggering price-insensitive retail con-
sumers’rationing; and conversely.
Proposition 7 When consumers are rationed optimally ex post,
(i) equilibrium behavior must belong to one of the three regimes described above;
(ii) there may be two equilibria under LSE competition, one with rationing and the other
without.
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4 Network collapses and operating reserves
This section relaxes another key assumption underlying our benchmark proposition (Proposi-
tion 1). There, we assumed that, while there may be insufficient resources and rationing, this
rationing is "orderly" in the sense that it makes use of all available generation resources. This
assumption is a decent approximation for, say, controlled rolling blackouts where the system
operator sheds load sequentially to ensure that demand does not exceed available generating
capacity. It is not for system collapses where deviations in network frequency or voltage lead
to both generators and load tripping out by automatic protection equipment whose operation is
triggered by physical disturbances on the network. For example, the August 14, 2003 blackout
in the Eastern United States and Ontario led to the loss of power to over 50 million consumers
as the networks in New York, Ontario, Northern Ohio, Michigan and portions of other states
collapsed. Over 60,000 MW of generating capacity was knocked out of service in a few minutes
time. Most of the generating capacity under the control of the New York ISO tripped out despite
the fact that there was a surplus of generating capacity to meet demand within the New York
ISO’s control area. Full restoration of service took up to 48 hours. (U.S.-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force, 2003). The September 28, 2003 blackout in Italy led to a loss of power
across the entire country and suddenly knocked out over 20,000 MW of generating capacity.
Restoration of power supplies to consumers was completed about 20 hours after the blackout
began (UCTE, 2003).
Conceptually, there is a key difference between rolling blackouts in which the system operator
sequentially sheds relatively small fractions of total demand each for a relatively short time to
match available supplies in a controlled fashion and a total system collapse in which both
demand and generation shuts down over a large area in an uncontrolled fashion. Under a rolling
blackout, available generation is extremely valuable (actually, its value is VOLL). By contrast,
available plants are almost valueless when the system collapses. To put it differently, there
is then an externality imposed by generating plants (or transmission lines) that initiate the
collapse sequence on the other plants that trip out of service as the blackout cascades through
the system, that does not exist in an orderly, rolling blackout.
It is useful here to relate this economic argument to standard engineering considerations
concerning total system operating reserves (OpRes). In addition to dispatching generators to
supply energy to match demand, system operators schedule additional generating capacity to
provide operating reserves (OpRes). OpRes typically consist of “spinning reserves” which can
be fully ramped up to supply a specified rate of electric energy production in less than 10
minutes and “non-spinning reserves” which can be fully ramped up to supply energy in up
26
to 30 minutes (60 minutes in some places). OpRes are used to respond to sudden outages of
generating plants or transmission lines that are providing supplies of energy to meet demand in
real time, sufficiently quickly to maintain the frequency, voltage and stability parameters of the
network within acceptable ranges. Additional generation is also scheduled to provide continuous
frequency regulation (or automatic generation control) to stabilize network frequency in response
to small instantaneous variations in demand and generation. These ancillary network support
services require scheduling additional generating capacity equal to roughly 10-12% of electricity
demand at any point in time. In the U.S., regional reliability councils specify the requirements for
frequency regulation and operating reserves, as well as other ancillary services such as reactive
power supplies and blackstart capabilities, that system operators are expected to maintain.
Pending U.S. legislation would make these and other reliability standards mandatory for system
operators.
Let us use a simple model of OpRes in order to analyze the various issues at stake. To
keep modeling details to a minimum without altering insights, the demand side is modeled as
inelastic: in state i ∈ [0, 1], demand is Di. If di · Di is served, the consumers’ gross surplus is
div, where v is the value per kWh (the value of lost load). Similarly, on the supply side, there
is a single technology: capacity K involves investment cost KI and marginal cost c, which we
normalize at 0 in order to simplify accounting.
The key innovation relative to the benchmark model is that the extent of scarcity is not
fully known at the time that generating units with uncertain availability are scheduled to meet
the demand dispatched by the system operator. We formalize this uncertainty as an uncertain
capacity availability factor λ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, a fraction 1 − λ of the scheduled capacity K will
break down. The distribution Hi (λ) (with Hi(0) = 0 and Hi(1) = 1) can be state-contingent.35
There may be an atom in the distribution at λ = 1 (full availability), but the distribution has
otherwise a smooth density hi (λ).36 We make the following weak assumption:
hi (λ) λ
[1−Hi (λ)]
is increasing in λ
(a sufficient condition for this is the standard assumption that the hazard rate hi/ [1−Hi] is
increasing in λ, which is satisfied for most commonly used continuous probability distributions.)
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
35For example, if plant unavailability comes from the breakdown of a transmission line connecting the plant
and the load, the transmission line may be more likely to break down under extreme weather conditions, for which
load Di is also large.
36We assume a continuous distribution solely for tractability purposes. In practice, system operators fear
foremost the breakdown of large plants or transmission lines and therefore adopt reliability criteria of the type
“n − 1” or “n − 2”. This introduces “integer problems”, but no fundamental difference in analysis.
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The timing goes as in Figure 2: given nominal capacity K and demand Di, the ISO chooses
how much of this demand to dispatch, or alternatively how much demand to curtail, and a reserve
margin. More formally, once load Di is realized, the system operator can curtail an amount
Di − di ≥ 0 of load. He also chooses a reserve coefficient ri, so that a capacity (1+ ri)di · K
must be ready to be dispatched. Then, the capacity availability λi is revealed and the demand
di · Di is served or the network collapses: if λi [(1+ ri)di] < di, the system collapses, and no
energy is produced or consumed.
We assume that scheduling generation to be (potentially) available to serve demand costs
s per unit (s can be either a monetary cost of keeping the plant ready to be dispatched or an
opportunity cost of not being able to perform maintenance at an appropriate time).
a) Social optimum
A Ramsey social planner would solve:
max
{K,d·,r·}
¯
E[[1−Hi(
1
1+ ri
)]v− s (1+ ri)]di − KI
°
such that, for all states i ∈ [0, 1]:
di · Di (μi)
(1+ ri)di · K, (νi)
where μi and νi are the shadow prices of the constraints.
For conciseness, we analyze only the case where it is optimal to accumulate reserves in each
state. The first-order conditions with respect to ri, di and K are, respectively:
hi
(1+ ri)
2
v− s = νi, (10)
[1−Hi] v− s (1+ ri) = μi + (1+ ri)νi, with μi = 0 unless di = Di (11)
and
E [νi] = I. (12)
Specializing the model to the case in which Hi is state-independent,37 let us analyze the
optimal dispatching, as described by (10) and (11). The Ramsey optimum is depicted in Figure
3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
37We will still use state-denoting subscripts, though, so as to indicate the value taken for H in state i. For
example, Hi = H (1/ (1 + ri)).
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Off-peak (Di small), there is excess capacity, all demand is served (di = Di), and νi = 0.
Hence from (10) and (11)
r = rH
where38
h( 1
1+rH
)
(1+ rH)
2
v = s.
We of course assume that for this value, it is worth dispatching load (μi > 0), or
[1−H(
1
1+ rH
)]v > s (1+ rH) .
The off-peak region is defined by:
(1+ rH)Di < K.
Peaking time can be decomposed into two regions. As Di grows, load first keeps being
satisfied: di = Di, and reserves become leaner (and so the probability of a blackout increases as
load grows):
(1+ ri)Di = K.
Load starts being shed when μi = 0, or
hi
[1−Hi]
·
1
1+ ri
= 1,
which from our assumptions has a unique solution:
rL < rH.
The optimal investment policy is then given by:
I =
Z K
1+rL
K
1+rH
[
hi
(1+ ri)
2
v− s]fidi+
Z∞
K
1+rL
[(1−Hi)
v
(1+ rL)
− s]fidi.
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation represents the quasi-rents in reserve
reduction states: an extra unit of capacity is used to increase reserves and thereby reduce the
probability of network collapse, 1 − Hi (Di/K), then saving value of lost load from a network
collapse vDi; to this term must be subtracted the cost s of scheduling generation. And the
second term represents the quasi-rents in load shedding states: An extra unit of capacity allows
38We assume that this equation has a unique solution, the equation λ2h (λ) = s/v has a unique solution
in (Di /K, 1). Because λh/ (1 − H) is inceasing, so is λ2h (λ). And so the solution indeed exists as long as
λih (λi) < s/v < h(1) for λi = Di /K.
29
a reduction in load shedding, which has value (1−Hi) v/ (1+ rL) minus the cost s of scheduling
generation.
Remark (adding price-sensitive consumers): A similar, although more complex analysis can be
performed when price-sensitive consumers are present. Let bSi ³bDi´ denote their gross surplus
function in state i. The demand function bDi (pi), given by bSi ³bDi (pi)´ ≡ pi, is assumed to
be increasing with i. There are again three possible regions: a no-capacity-constraint region,
a capacity-constraint, no-load-shedding region, and a load-shedding region. In the former two
regions, the price pi charged to price-sensitive consumers and the reserve ratio ri in general react
to the state of demand, but price-sensitive consumers are not rationed, as v > pi. In the third
region, pi = v and price-insensitive consumers are rationed.39
b) Implementation
First, note that the possibility of system collapses make operating reserves a public good.
Network users take its reliability as exogenous to their own policy and thus are unwilling to
voluntarily contribute to reserves. The market-determined level of reliability is therefore the
size of the atom of the H (·) distribution at full availability λ = 1. Thus, the market solution
leads to an insufficient level of reliability. In order to obtain a proper level of reliability, the
system operator must purchase (or require LSEs to purchase based on their retail customers’
demand) a fraction ri of reserves for each unit of load.40
Does this market mechanism cum regulation of reserve ratios generate enough quasi-rents to
induce the optimal investment policy? Off-peak (Di < K/ (1+ rH)), the price paid by consumers
for reserves is (1+ rH) s, and there are no quasi-rents.
When load is curtailed (Di > K/ (1+ rL)), then consumers must pay v/ (1+ rL) conditionally
on being actually served (which has probability 1−Hi). Thus, generators obtain, as they should,
39The first-order conditions are:
hi
(1 + ri)2
h
vdi + bSi ³bDi´i = (s + νi) ³di + bDi´ ,
(1 − Hi )pi = (s + νi) (1 + ri) ,
(1 − Hi ) v = (s + νi) (1 + ri) + μi .
For an example, in the no-capacity-constraint region (νi = μi = 0),
hi
(1 + ri) (1 − Hi)
=
pi
³
Di + bDi´
vDi + bSi ³bDi´ .
That is, the hazard rate of the reliability distribution is equal to the ratio of the market value of demand to the
corresponding social surplus.
40There is no point further asking generators to hold reserves.
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quasi-rent:
(1−Hi)
v
1+ rL
− s
in this region.
The intermediate region is more complex to implement through an auction-type mechanism.
In the absence of price-responsive load, the supply curve and the total demand curve (energy plus
reserves) are vertical and identical. Hence a small mistake in the choice of reserve ratio creates
wild swings in the market price (from (1+ ri) s to v/ (1+ ri) conditionally on being served). In
particular, the system operator can bring price down to marginal cost without hardly affecting
reliability. This has potentially significant implications for investment incentives.
The “knife edge” problem has been recognized by system operators. It puts a lot of discretion
in the hands of the system operator to affect prices and investment incentives as small deviations
in this range can have very big effects on prices. In the end, determining when there is an
operating reserve deficiency (or a forecast operating reserve deficiency) may necessarily involve
some discretion because it depends in part on attributes of the network topology that are not
reflected in a refined way in the rough requirements for operating reserves (e.g. ramp up in less
than 10 minutes). So, for example, stored hydro is generally thought to be a superior source
of operating reserves than fossil plants because the former can be ramped up almost instantly
rather than in 9 minutes. If there is a lot of hydro in the OpRes portfolio the system operator
will be less likely to be concerned about a small shortfall in operating reserves.
Alternatively, the system operator can compute the marginal social benefit, (hi
Di
K2
) · (Div)−s,
of the reduction in the probability of collapse brought about by an additional unit of investment.
This regulated price for reserves (and thus for energy) then yields the appropriate quasi-rent:
hi
(1+ ri)
2
v− s
to generators in this region. Accurately computing the regulated prices in this region also
involves substantial discretion, however.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the extent of scarcity is not known with certainty at the time of
generator and load dispatch.
(i) The socially optimal policy involves, as the forecasted demand grows, three regimes:
• Off peak: the entire load is dispatched, and operating reserves are set at a fixed, maximum
percentage of load.
• Reserve shedding: the entire load is dispatched, and operating reserves are reduced as
generation capacity is binding.
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• Load shedding: Load is curtailed, and operating reserves satisfy a fixed, minimum ratio
relative to load.
(ii) The possibility of system collapses makes operating reserves a public good. As a result,
investments in operating reserves do not emerge spontaneously as a market outcome. The load
should be forced to pay for a pre-determined quantity of operating reserves (e.g. as a proportion
of their demand) :
• a price set at VOLL (divided by one plus the reserve ratio, conditionally on being served)
in the load shedding region,
• a market clearing price given the ratio requirement off peak,
• a price growing from marginal cost to the load-shedding-region price in the reserve-shedding
region.
Decentralization through an operating reserves market together with a mandatory reserve
ratio is delicate as the price of reserves is extremely sensitive to small mistakes or discretionary
actions by the system operator.
5 Conclusion
We derived the (second-best) optimal program for prices, output and investment for an electricity
sector in which price-insensitive consumers may have to be rationed under some contingencies.
This allocation provides a benchmark against which the actual performance of electricity sec-
tors, and the effects of the imposition of various regulatory and non-market mechanisms and
constraints, can be compared. We went on to show that competitive wholesale and retail markets
will support this second-best "Ramsey" allocation under a particular set of assumptions.
The assumptions underpinning these results are very strong. Our research program seeks
to evaluate the effects of departures from the assumptions needed to support the benchmark
allocation. In this paper we focused on relaxing the assumptions (a) that wholesale electricity
prices reflect the social opportunity cost of generation and (b) that rationing, if any, is orderly
and makes efficient use of available generation.
To examine the effects of relaxing the first assumption, we analyzed the effects of regulator-
imposed prices caps motivated either by concerns about market power in the real time market or
by regulatory opportunism. While price caps can significantly reduce the scarcity rents required
to cover the costs of investment in peaking capacity, lead to underinvestment, and distort the
prices seen by consumers, with at most three states of nature (and up to two states with market
power), capacity obligations and associated capacity payments can restore investment incentives
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if all generating capacity is eligible to meet capacity obligations and receive capacity payments,
and all consumer demand is subject to capacity obligations.
Another lesson of our analysis is the possibility of self-fulfilling rationing prophecies. Con-
sumers are interdependent when either the system operator must ration at the zonal rather than
individual level or when a generator with market power chooses its price. The system operator in
the former case, and the generator in the latter, base their choice on the average retail contract.
LSEs charge a low price to their customers if they expect these to be rationned, which generates
very large peak demands and ex post socially optimal rationning of these customers.
Our analysis then proceeded to examine the effects of relaxation of the second assumption
underpinning the benchmark allocation. We used a model of uncertain demand and operating
reserves to analyse the effects of network collapses that result in rationing of demand while
generation that is potentially available to meet this demand stands idle. Unlike the benchmark
model, the extent of scarcity is not known with certainty at the time of generator dispatch.
In this model operating reserves are a public good and without mandatory operating reserve
requirements there would be under-investment in operating reserves and lower reliability than
is optimal. Moreover, under certain contingencies the market price, and the associated scarcity
rents available to support investments in generating capacity, are extremely sensitive to small
mistakes or discretionary actions by the system operator. This “knife edge” problem and options
for dealing with it requires further analysis and attention in the development of the rules and
incentive arrangements governing system operators.
In Joskow-Tirole (2005) we examine relaxation of the other key assumptions that underpin
the benchmark model, focusing on the impacts of load profiling, zonal rationing of demand
for both price-sensitive and price-insensitive consumers, and more general characterizations of
consumer heterogeneity. Taken together, these results suggest that the combination of the
unusual physical attributes of electricity and electric power networks and associated reliability
considerations, limitations on metering of real time consumer demand and responsiveness to real
time prices, restrictions on the ability to ration individual consumers, discretionary behavior by
system operators, makes achieving an efficient allocation of resources with competitive wholesale
and retail market mechanisms a very challenging task.
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